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Abstract Despite a more recent debate about ever deeper
segmentation, the authors argue that since industrialization,
Germany has continually experienced a dual labor market.
One segment contains the primary segment of better paid
and more attractive jobs, while the secondary segment en-
compasses rather low paid, less stable and less attractive
jobs. Dualization is the result of firms which are likely to
hire full-time and long-term workforce for its core activi-
ties while relying on more flexible forms of employment
for other activities. Based on an in-depth examination of
the structure of the workforce since 1871, the article inves-
tigates the factors which account for the origin, evolution
and the peculiarities of the country’s core workforce. The
authors show that a non-negligible part of the working pop-
ulation has always been subjected to marginalization, but
that the dividing line between the two segments has changed
over time as has the character of the respective groups.
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Die Segmentierung der Belegschaft in
Deutschland: von der Gründerzeit bis heute
Zusammenfassung Trotz der jüngsten Debatte um eine
zunehmende Segmentierung des deutschen Arbeitsmarkts,
argumentieren die Autoren, dass Deutschland bereits seit
der Gründerzeit eine duale Ausprägung des Arbeitsmarkts
erfahren hat. Hiernach verfügt das primäre Segment über
besser bezahlte und attraktive Arbeitsplätze, wohingegen
das sekundäre Segment eher gering bezahlte und weniger
attraktive Arbeitsplätze aufweist. Diese Form des dualen
Arbeitsmarkts resultiert aus Vollzeitstellen und zugleich
langfristigen Beschäftigungsverhältnissen, die rundum der
Kernaktivitäten eines Unternehmens angesiedelt sind. Hin-
gegen wird bei weniger relevanten Tätigkeiten auf flexible-
re Beschäftigungsformen zurückgegriffen. Der vorliegen-
de Artikel untersucht die Belegschaftsstruktur innerhalb
Deutschlands seit dem Jahr 1871 und gibt Einblick in die
Gründe für die Entstehung, die Entwicklung sowie die
Besonderheiten der Stammbelegschaft in Deutschland. Die
Autoren zeigen auf, dass ein nicht unerheblicher Teil der
Belegschaft in Deutschland seit jeher einer gewissen Form
der Marginalisierung ausgesetzt gewesen ist. Jedoch unter-
lagen sowohl die Trennlinien als auch der Charakter dieser
beiden Segmente im Verlauf der Zeit einem deutlichen
Wandel.
1 Introduction
In recent political discourse, the marginalization and pre-
cariousness of a part of the workforce is discussed either
as a menacing phenomenon that looms large over the past
decades (Vosko 2000; Kalleberg 2009; Ross 2009) or as
a much needed mechanism to increase a firm’s flexibil-
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ity (Saint-Paul 1996; Kalleberg 2001). However, research
on employment indicates that the workforce has always
been subjected to some sort of segmentation (Blossfeld and
Mayer 1988; Pollert 1988) and that, from a historic per-
spective, the discourse on the use of a core and a peripheral
workforce appears exaggerated (Gallie et al. 1998). Against
this backdrop, this article seeks to examine the factors con-
tributing to the emergence and change in the demarcation
of a core workforce and its counterpart since the founding
era (Gründerzeit), beginning with the establishment of the
German Reich in 1871, to the present time in Germany.
The core workforce can be defined as workforce, in-
cluding a longer duration of employment and significant
firm-specific skills. In this article, these conditions serve as
criteria to differ between the core and the peripheral work-
force. In doing so, the authors further specify that a longer
duration of employment comprises at least two years of
employment for the same company. The main reason for
this is that a fixed term contract within the industrial sector
in Germany today is not allowed to last longer than two
years. Plus, firm-specific skills are understood as specific
capabilities, knowledge, and experiences within a strictly
defined field of application – often comprising only a cer-
tain section, production facility or part of the production
process (Lutz 1987, p. 2–49).
The investigation of the workforce is carried out ac-
cording to two basic segmentation theories which will be
presented in the next section. The investigation focuses
primarily on workers and employees of industrial compa-
nies. Only in the end of this analysis, the service sector
is addressed, as the structural change within the German
economy led to a strong increase of service-related work-
places. Thereby, a workplace is understood as the overall
sum of all tasks assigned to an individual worker or em-
ployee (Lutz 1987, p. 55). Ever since the industrialization,
the chemical, electrical, metal and steel industry as well
as the machine and automobile construction have occupied
the largest amount of workers and thus served as flagship
industries. For this reason, the survey focuses on these
branches across Germany.
2 Theoretical background
According to Reich et al. (1973), the segmentation pro-
cess inside the labor market can be described as a histori-
cal process, whereby political-economic forces promote the
division of the market into segments. Those segments, in
turn, differ by certain labor market characteristics as well
as behavioral rules (Reich et al. 1973, p. 359). Referring
to further literature on this issue, Loveridge (1983) exam-
ines the labor market dichotomization between a core and a
peripheral workforce. According to him, the primary seg-
ment of the labor market is marked by long-term and stable
earnings, whereas the secondary segment is characterized
by unstable earnings.
Likewise, Hakim (1990) notes that the central workforce
of a company consists of workplaces related to a primary in-
ternal sector. In particular those workplaces are permanent,
full-time and associated with firm-specific skills and result
in long-term, stable earnings. Conversely, the secondary
external sector comprises rather seasonal, casual and short-
term contract work, work from home as well as some un-
skilled work (Hakim 1990, p. 160). For this investigation
it is essential that the dividing factors or mechanisms are
categorized according to two underlying explanatory ap-
proaches (Lutz 1987): firstly, the economic-functional di-
mension and secondly, the political-institutional dimension.
The first argument contains the evolution of a core work-
force, which results from firms aiming at profitability and a
long-term interest to survive. This approach entails the view
that a stable and long-term workforce, protected against
employment risks and major competition, shows a highly
favorable cost-benefit ratio. According to the transaction
cost theory (Williamson 1984, 1985), employers aim at
safeguarding revenues resulting from firm-specific invest-
ments, such as investments into human capital. Thus, it is
more cost-effective to retain a stable workforce and create
an internal market than hiring new workers for each new
work task (Nienhueser 2014). The individual’s qualification
serves therefore as a dominant pattern for both the horizon-
tal and vertical division of labor within a firm. Following
the basic logic of stairs, workplaces equal certain skill re-
quirements, which increase step by step. If a worker or
employee fulfills the duties of his workplace, it becomes
most likely that even the requirements of the next, and
more demanding workplace, are met. Thus, those internal
climbers generate only low costs for the company.
The second approach includes a political-institutional di-
mension. This approach focuses on measures taken by so-
cial partners, such as welfare-state arrangements in order
to protect the workers and employees. Further literature,
in particular the radicals literature, see for instance Rubery
(1978), Bruno (1979), and Craig et al. (1982), interprets
firm-internal segmentation as a strategy to divide the work-
ing class. Those radical segmentation theorists argue that
the workforce strategy in view of the promotion of inter-
nal labor markets, and thus retaining workers within their
firms, can be due to the intention to repel or push back the
influence of unions (Lutz 1987, p. 7–152).
The political-institutional dimension goes in line with
Piore (1983, p. 251), whereupon large parts of the labor
market are regulated by institutions. An important example
constitutes labor market regulations, which are frequently
shaped by the bargaining power of workers (Blanchard and
Giavazzi 2001). Thereafter, union power, union coverage
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as well as the degree of coordination of wage agreements
(Layard et al. 2005, p. XV) significantly impact labor mar-
ket legislation, including, for example, employment pro-
tection legislation. By applying the political-institutional
explanatory approach, it is possible to analyze as to how
the relevant actors influence the emergence of a peripheral
and core workforce (Layard and Nickell 1999).
To explore this issue further, the new institutionalism can
be divided into three major strands: The rational choice ap-
proach, the view of the historical institutionalists, and the
sociological institutionalism. According to the historical in-
stitutionalists, institutions can be described by all formal or
informal procedures which are embedded in the organiza-
tional arrangement of the political economy. This approach
takes into account the asymmetries of powers concerning
the relevant actors in view of the development of institu-
tions.
Furthermore, this view includes the assumption of path
dependent social causation. That is, the historical institu-
tionalists investigate how institutions produce paths in the
sense that they create a response to new challenges, such
as, for instance, the creation of the accident insurance in
the course of the industrialization. The rational choice ap-
proach is based upon rather heroic assumptions such as the
prescience of actors, including their capacity to influence
the exact outcome of the institution, which, from a more re-
alistic point of view, can only hardly be predicted (Hall and
Taylor 1996, p. 936–951). Nevertheless, according to the
rational choice approach within the historical institutional-
ism, institutions can be regarded as independent variables,
explaining the pattern of a certain result and thus the de-
pendent variable, which is in this case the formation of a
core workforce.
More specifically, the historical institutionalism high-
lights that institutions can be considered as a product of
temporal processes. These institutions encompass rules,
policy structures or certain norms. In this respect, historical
institutionalists deal rather with the origins than the func-
tions of newly created institutions. Hereafter, the evolution
of the German model was not synchronous and marked
by rather unintended consequences. For example, in Ger-
many the intensive confrontation between the so-called so-
cial partners, namely employers and employees, led to the
introduction or changes of institutions such as the voca-
tional training system and the social welfare institutions.
In that sense, path dependency includes parts that are kept
(continuity) and parts which are modified (change). This
implies for the article that the origin or rather development
of institutions has to be viewed in their political and so-
cial setting. This approach recognizes that institutions are
socially constructed and reflect a cultural understanding of
the world (Thelen 1999, p. 382–386).
Advocates of the economic-functional strand (Doeringer
and Piore 1971, 1975; Dickens and Lang 1985, 1988), how-
ever, claim that labor market segmentation arises mainly
because it is functional. That said, the segmentation pro-
cess is caused by a change in the production strategy of
firms for economic efficiency reasons. Schmiede (1997)
characterizes the economic-functional dimension as an in-
strument to safeguard and protect the overall productivity
of a company. Closely linked with the economic-functional
explanatory approach or theory is the concept of skill for-
mation. In this approach, a firm’s staff can be divided into
two groups based on either high or low skill levels. Core
activities require high and firm-specific skills that enhance a
company’s competitiveness (Friedman 1977). This kind of
qualification can be achieved through training and further
education (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 6–7; Emmenegger
2009).
The other group belongs to the periphery, comprising
rather unskilled work. As Williamson (1985) has amply
demonstrated, skill specificity exposes the owner of the
skills to ex post opportunism. Therefore, workers need
assurances that they can remain in the company for a long
enough period to reap the returns on such skill investments
(Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). Consequently, jobs including
core activities are usually paired with long-term contracts.
This is also advantageous for the companies themselves
because firm-specific qualifications might be lost through
high fluctuation between different factories (Lutz 1973,
p. 58–59).
This implies that even with very flexible and universal
labor market institutions, some sort of workforce segmenta-
tion emerges for economic-functional or rather operational
reasons. To further analyze the segmentation process of
the workforce, taking place in Germany from 1871 to the
present time, we use the two previously mentioned explana-
tory approaches: firstly, the political-institutional arrange-
ment of the labor market, comprising labor legislation and
the role of interest groups, such as unions and employers
associations. Secondly, the authors shed light to the eco-
nomic-functional logic behind production strategies. The
latter allows considering investments in skill formation,
which are attributed to the emergence of diversified quality
production in Germany (Streeck 1991, 1997; Thelen 2004).
Beyond this, Streeck’s investigation regarding the polit-
ical economy in Germany points to certain institutional ar-
rangements, for instance the vocational education and train-
ing system as well as collective bargaining, which not only
influence the strategies of companies but also strengthen
them. Both mentioned institutions facilitate and support
strategies, depending on high-skill and high value produc-
tion, and thus contribute to succeeding in international mar-
kets (Thelen 1999, p. 393). As regards collective agree-
ments, it is possible to further differentiate between sec-
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Fig. 1 The different dimensions of the segmentation process
toral and occupational collective agreements. While the
first takes place at branch level, for instance agreements
regulating wages and working time solely for the machin-
ery industry, the latter encompasses specific professions.
Both sectoral and occupational collective agreements as
well as the vocational training system and the social security
system stabilize the existence of so-called inter-company
labor markets, whereas company-sponsored social benefits
as well as dismissal protection foster the rise of internal
labor markets. Inter-company labor markets constitute cen-
tral elements for workers and employees and are essential
to meet the demand for labor. Nonetheless, it is worth not-
ing that only few articles within the German literature deal
with this phenomenon (Grund 2001, p. 392). The inter-
company labor market functions as equivalent for work-
place security. For example, occupational labor markets for
specific professions combine flexibility and security, since
standardized qualifications reduce the transaction costs of
firms. That is, the recruitment of workers and employees is
incentivized. For those employed, this market offers both
entrance and exit possibilities (Krause and Köhler 2012,
p. 32). Occupational qualifications, and thus the existence
of inter-company labor markets, are closely associated with
the German craftsmanship (Köhler et al. 2007, p. 389).
However, contrary to mass production, diversified qual-
ity production depends on a workforce with various levels
of skills. This means that workers or employees are able to
develop new technologies through intense and close cooper-
ation with other workers or managers. This often includes
long lasting and relatively stable relationships, or rather
partnerships, between the economic actors within the firm
and their external partners, such as suppliers and customers.
In addition to this, specialized firms have to innovate con-
stantly. To do so, they rely on training to create a skilled
workforce (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997, p. 22–25).
Hereby, the vocational education and training system is
marked by two key features: First, after a short training
period, workers are enabled to cope with all tasks and prob-
lems they face within their profession. Second, with passing
a vocational education and training, workers possess char-
acteristics of a branded product, which goes in line with a
highly reliable employability in the form of foreseeable ca-
pabilities (Lutz 1987, p. 42–44). For this reason, long-term
employment relationships guarantee that employers receive
a return of investment to compensate their costly training
effort. The formation of a skilled workforce inside a firm
can therefore be considered as a measure to combat the
poaching problem (Thelen 2007, p. 249).
In addition to the previously explained approaches, we
introduce another approach to address the vocational train-
ing system in order to analyze the upcoming scenario. The
vocational training system entails elements of both the eco-
nomic-functional and political-institutional explanatory ap-
proaches. For example, on the one hand, from the economic
perspective, it makes sense for a company to invest in train-
ing and development of the workforce to further innovate.
On the other hand, from an institutional perspective, vo-
cational training systems require the participation of social
partners to initiate, maintain and agree to such a system.
At the same time, the government must invest in training
facilities such as vocational training schools. Against this
background, the vocational training system reflects a hybrid
constellation, including elements of both views, as shown
by the overlapping circles in Fig. 1.
To summarize, political-institutional and economic-func-
tional approaches reveal diverging drivers of segmentation.
Nevertheless, both perspectives can be combined. It is
an empirical question of how the exact interplay and ex-
tent to which institutional and functional factors shape the
workforce in a dynamic perspective. Following the ratio-
nal choice approach within the historical institutionalism,
but extending this model slightly, institutions and the eco-
nomic logic of firms both constitute independent variables,
describing certain pattern of results (the dependent vari-
able), which is here the formation of the core workforce.
3 From the founding era until World War I
From a broad economic perspective, the timeframe between
the ‘founding era’, defined by the period just after the es-
tablishment of the German Reich in 1871, and World War
I (1914–1918) was marked by the industrialization process.
During this time, the general working conditions for the vast
majority of the industrial workforce were poor, including
long working hours, heavy physical work, and a general
absence of any kind of social insurance institutions. As
addressed earlier, and to first analyze the segmentation pro-
cess within this workforce, the duration of employment of
a worker within a specific company and firm-specific skills
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are chosen to serve as criteria for the differentiation of the
workforce.
Ditt (1994) estimates that during the time of early factory
workers only one fourth of the entire workforce belonged
to the core. Schmiede (1997) concludes that for the 1880s
amongst all industrial workers the average duration of em-
ployment lasted not more than one year. As during this time
Germany can be characterized by a rather rural society, of-
ten including farmhands shifting their activities between
classic farm work and handicraft activities, depending on
the season. Thus, it took some time before workers fully
bound themselves to this new and often unstable form of
production in factories. Contemporary discussion denoted
high fluctuation rates as the childhood disease of the early
days of the factory system (Schmiede 1997).
Various companies, such as those in the chemical indus-
try, which experienced especially high fluctuation rates due
to imminent health risks, introduced measures on a vol-
untary basis to attract and stabilize its workforce through
a wide range of social services (Riemer-Schäfer in press,
p. 111–155). Phoenix Ironworks provides an example for
the early German metal industry. Here, the core workforce
was rewarded after a longstanding period of employment
by guaranteeing job security and offering corporate social
benefits. Another example is Alfred Krupp who created a
company health insurance fund. The number of workers
covered by all three branches of the social security sys-
tem increased considerably during 1890 and 1913, with a
significantly high number of workers covered by accident
insurance right from the beginning (Kendzia 2010a).
In accordance with the economic-functional explanatory
approach, factories were established as the general organi-
zational form of production, out of which, larger compa-
nies developed (Vetterli 1979; Stolle 1980). Craftsmen with
specialized knowledge formed a privileged group within the
broad mass of workers. In order to keep those workers in
the factories, employers attempted to create incentives for
long-term employment relationships.
This was realized, for instance, by higher wages for
skilled workers, establishing occupational pension schemes
and building apartments for a particular part of the perma-
nent workforce. In contrast, the unskilled and semi-skilled
workers still fluctuated between different factories to a high
degree during this time (Lutz 1987). Within the machinery
and iron industry in Berlin, Heiss (1909) observed a sig-
nificant correlation between the age and the wage level. A
similar relationship could be found between the duration of
employment and the wage legel (Heiss 1909, p. 182–185),
indicating an early example for the phenomenon of senior-
ity wages.
Siemens extended the occupational pension scheme al-
ready in 1872, comprising all workers and employees. The
pension claim came into place after ten years of employ-
ment for Siemens. When a worker or employee left the
company at an earlier stage, the claim was lost. Prior to
World War I, the occupational pension scheme amounted
to 50 % of all voluntary social benefits Siemens paid. An-
other example constituted Krupp’s Gussstahlfabrik in Essen
which constituted a typical factory city. The workers and
inhabitants of the companies’ apartments were considered
to be the real “Krupps”, knowing that they were the last
to be dismissed and amongst the first to be again hired.
Furthermore, their sons had good chances to get one day
an apprenticeship within the firm. The extensive construc-
tion of apartment for the companies’ workers became one
of the most important instruments to build up a core work-
force (Schmiede 1997, p. 52–53).
Owing to the increasing technological requirements
within the production process, large firms sought to form
a core workforce to safeguard the availability of skilled
workers. For this purpose, vocational training systems
were established. Thus, the vocational training system can
be interpreted as a hybrid form of the segmentation process
where institutional aspects (interest of the government) and
operational aspects (training of workers) converged. In the
beginning, apprentices were often recruited among the rel-
atives of the already employed workers due to the expected
positive effect on solidarity and stability in the workforce
(Deutschmann 1985, p. 124–217). Since then, the voca-
tional training system in Germany has been combining
work experience by learning on-the-job with classroom
education, including in general a rather smooth transition
into employment (Zimmermann et al. 2013, p. 41).
This procedure further reduced the fluctuation of the
workforce (Harney and vom Hau 2010, p. 11–13). For
example, MAN (Maschinenfabrik Augsburg Nürnberg) in-
troduced its own institutionalized training workshop in the
1890s. By designing a training program which met the firm-
specific needs, the company established a core of skilled
workers. Another example of this increased stability of the
workforce in the machinery industry is provided by Daim-
ler-Motoren-Gesellschaft. Given that a fixed term contract
within the industrial sector in Germany today must not last
longer than two years, a core worker is considered to be em-
ployed longer than two years in the same company. Table 1
and 2 indicates that in 1910, already more than 70 % of the
overall workforce belonged to the core group (Schudlich
1994, p. 78–79).
Regarding the political-institutional dimension within
the first section of the analysis, it is worth noting that the
first collective wage agreement in Germany was settled in
1873. Yet, the state refused to accept the agreement. It took
until 1899 before collective agreements began to spread
across Germany and other western European countries.
Prior to that time, wages were usually negotiated individ-
ually between the workers and their potential employers.
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Table 1 Duration of employment at the Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft in Stuttgart-Untertürkheim in 1910, %
Duration in years All workers Locksmiths, tool-
makers
Lathe operators Shapers Operatives, grinders
Less than 1 20.2 20.3 25.1 23.3 12.0
1–2 8.2 8.3 2.9 27.9 2.1
2–6 51.5 52.2 44.4 46.5 53.1
7–10 16.5 15.7 21.4 0.0 26.6
10–16 2.6 2.9 4.5 2.3 4.7
17–20 0.8 0.6 1.6 0.0 1.6
Total 99.9 100 99.9 100 100.1
Source Schumann (1911, p. 48–56)
Table 2 Duration of employment at the Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft in Stuttgart-Untertürkheim in 1910, %
Duration in years Platers, plumbers, saddlers, copper-
smiths, painters, varnishers
Blacksmiths, fine forg-
ing
Carpenters Day laborers
Less than 1 19.7 18.2 34.3 17.6
1–2 4.1 11.0 6.1 10.5
2–6 55.1 37.9 45.5 61.3
7–10 19.0 21.2 10.1 9.0
10–16 1.4 0.6 3.0 0.9
17–20 0.7 0.0 1.0 0.6
Total 100 99.9 100 99.1
Source Schumann (1911, p. 48–56)
That is, soon after the beginning of our investigation, start-
ing with the foundation of the German Reich in 1871, wage
work experienced its first central institutional framework.
Only a short time later in 1875, the first trade unions in
Germany were installed. Thereafter, employers set up
the first employers’ associations to oppose the growing
numbers of workers organized in unions.
In 1891, a law regarding employment protection in-
cluded a ban on employment for school-children, the
restriction of the maximum working day to 10 h for young
people and to 11 h for women and the legal possibility to in-
stall work councils in factories. Through these regulations,
the position of workers was significantly strengthened.
Despite this, until 1899, collective agreements were not
widely spread across Germany (Kendzia 2010a, p. 26–36).
Between 1883 and 1891, the social security system was
politically introduced, including accident and health insur-
ance, old-age and disability as well as the pension insur-
ance. As such, the government responded formally to a
phenomenon which already existed within firms through
labor negotiations. Owing to the deep engagement of polit-
ical as well as industrial actors, the line between the institu-
tional and functional dimensions cannot be drawn precisely.
This aggravates the assessment regarding the true driving
forces behind the segmentation process. The implementa-
tion of the social security system constituted an appropriate
mechanism to protect workers against risks in their work-
ing lives. By reducing the prevailing high fluctuation of
the workforce during this time, it seemed to be a useful
instrument to stabilize the workforce and laid a foundation
for the creation of a core workforce inside firms.
In the metal, electrical and chemical industry even more
examples can be found, which highlights the importance of
loyalty towards a firm. Within the largely expanding elec-
tric industry, high employment fluctuation was common
among young workers and even skilled workers, of which
many aimed at becoming self-employed (Bienkowski 1910,
p. 19–20). In contrast, within the chemical industry, the
most important criterion to climb up the career ladder was
linked with long employment in the same company rather
than the achievement of additional qualifications. Referring
to Schulz (1978) and Schäfer (1979), the parallel develop-
ment of both high fluctuation and increasing steadiness for
some workers emphasizes the existence of a core workforce
and a fluctuating peripheral workforce. And yet, the early
core workforce could not be identified by certain qualifi-
cations. Instead, the loyalty to the employer, in the form
of a long duration of employment, was a key factor in this
respect. That is, the early differentiation between the core
and peripheral workforce during industrialization depended
to a large extent on the duration the individual was working
for the same firm.
Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, already
more than 12,000 collective agreements existed for some-
what less than 200,000 firms employing 1.8 million work-
ers. Surprisingly, these agreements were being conducted
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Fig. 2 Occupational groups ac-
cording to the profession census,
Source Federal Statistical Office
1972, p. 142
within the context of heavy state repression of the worker’s
movement between 1890 and 1900.
Despite these repressions, the workers’ movement grew
continuously, amounting to 2.5 million unionized workers
in 1914. At the same time, employers began forming as-
sociations, resulting in meetings between workers and em-
ployers at the association level. Despite this, the state did
not allow any party greater legislative involvement in the
process of fixing wages and thus did not approve collec-
tive agreements. This remained to be the case even though
the Supreme Court of the German Reich decided to con-
sider those collective agreements as legally binding in 1910
(Kendzia 2010a, p. 30–31).
Around the year 1895, as Fig. 2 displays, the proportion
of workers related to all occupational groups peaked. After
this, the groups of employees and civil servants as well as
the family workers began to grew, whereas the amount of
the self-employed decreased. And yet, until the beginning
of World War I, workers built the largest occupational group
across Germany.
4 World War I and the Weimar Republic
World War I and the mobilization of the armed forces in
1914 constituted a tremendous challenge for the labor mar-
ket. Additionally, employees’ institutions, such as work
councils and trade unions, became more influential. To sta-
bilize the working relationships of workers with firm-spe-
cific knowledge, firms advanced vocational training. Fol-
lowing the conscription of male workers, the unemploy-
ment rate among women rose strongly. In particular, the
conscription of skilled workers led to the closure of many
establishments, or parts thereof, which resulted in lay-offs
of unskilled workers. However, in the course of the war,
more and more women replaced men in the essential in-
dustries of the war economy, including the machine con-
struction, metal, electrical, and chemical industries (Daniel
1989, p. 28–44).
During World War I (1914–1918) itself, market mecha-
nisms were largely replaced by regulations imposed by the
state. Within the unions, more unskilled workers started to
become members, and thus a significant drop of the pro-
portion of skilled workers occurred. Compared to their
role during industrialization, trade unions acquired more
power, and workers’ rights were strengthened significantly
as collective bargaining and collective agreements became
the basis for the organization of work. Already in 1916, in
the wake of the Auxiliary Service Act (Hilfsdienstgesetz),
the state accepted the unions as legitimate representative
of the workforce. By 1924, the coverage of collective bar-
gaining amounted to roughly 61.2 % of the entire German
workforce, whereas in 1913, coverage was only 20 %. As
job-hopping was reduced, industry-wide bargaining had a
very positive impact on the decrease of the fluctuation rate
(Thelen 2004, p. 68–79).
Consequently, sectoral bargaining contributed markedly
to stabilizing employment relationships. Nonetheless, as
firm-specific skills characterize the core workforce, World
War I undermined the distinguishing criterion of the core
workforce. This ‘take what you can get’ employment policy
resulted in a dilution of the quality in view of the overall
workforce and led to a delimitation problem between the
core and peripheral workforce.
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At the end of the war, the collective actors, such as the
unions and employers’ organization had great influence on
the regulation of the labor market. Through the revolution-
ary events of the November Revolution of 1918–1919 and
the establishment of the Weimar Republic, the bargaining
power of the employers was severely weakened. Employers
were not in the position to oppose the current revolutionary
tendency and feared the expropriation of their establish-
ments.
Against this backdrop, an ‘alliance of purpose’ between
industry and the unions was built, resulting in the so-called
Stinnes-Legien-Agreement (taking the names of the main
negotiators) of 1918 which recognized trade unions for the
first time as a bargaining agent of workers. Hugo Stinnes
was then the leading industrialist from the Ruhr, a heavy
industrialized region in the western part of Germany, while
Carl Legien was chairing the general commission of the free
trade unions. The agreement constituted a breakthrough for
the unions, as collective agreements became legally bind-
ing and the employers approved unions as social partners
from that day on. In 1920, the Works Council Act (Betriebs-
rätegesetz) was adopted, allowing councils to co-determine
the terms of social and personnel affairs within companies.
Furthermore, dismissals were restricted and the first reg-
ulation of severance pay was laid down (Kendzia 2010b,
p. 9–18).
This restriction of hiring-and-firing practices had a pos-
itive impact on the emergence of internal labor markets.
In 1927, the so-called ‘standard employment relationship’
of the core workforce encompassed dismissal protection,
accident insurance, health insurance, pension insurance as
well as unemployment insurance. These social benefits pro-
vided incentives to invest in skills by guaranteeing income
for highly skilled workers in the case of possible layoffs.
As a result, more and more workers were covered by the
benefits of the social security system.
During the time of the Weimar Republic, to avoid over-
production, company coordination replaced the markets
mechanism. The strategy behind this proceeding aimed at
fixing prices in times of an increased fear due to a reduction
in the demand. To safeguard predictable profits for credi-
tors further helped to limit the inflow of external financial
means. Until 1923, in the absence of any laws against
cartels, free competition inside Germany faced tough resis-
tance. In contrast to this scenario, other major economics
during this time, such as the USA, England, and France,
had already introduced anti-cartel legislation prior to the
outbreak of World War I. The protection of the interests
of cartels and the widespread use of company cooperation
reflected the spirit of the time (Zeitgeist) and was based
on a wide societal consensus, assuming that organized
markets would achieve better results than pure competi-
tion. As a result, large trusts were implemented across
Germany. In 1925, in the steel industry, the Vereinigte
Stahlwerke (Vestag), including the Thyssen and Phönix
Group as well as other coal and steel groups, was created.
In the chemical sector, former competitors such as Bayer,
BASF and Hoechst merged into the IG Farbenindustrie.
In 1926 Daimler and Benz merged, however, an intended
large automobile trust, including BMW and Daimler-Benz,
could not be realized (Höpner and Krempel 2003).
Within the steel industry, other large producers pur-
chased new industries which led to a higher concentration.
In 1930, the Vereinigte Stahlwerke (Vestag) achieved a
market share of almost 50 % of the German steel market.
The machine construction industry faced fragmented prod-
uct markets, which contributed to further specialization
and emphasis on quality production due to a stagnating
domestic market and increasing international competition.
Hence, production relied heavily on a skilled workforce.
Another remarkable feature regarding the machine con-
struction industry was the rise of the diversified quality pro-
duction, which motivated employers to keep their skilled
workers instead of reducing the workforce during an eco-
nomic downturn (Herrigel 1996, p. 67–104). A plausible
reason for the retention of a core workforce, even during a
longer economic downturn, can be explained by the incom-
patibility between a short-term hiring and firing and a long-
term availability of a qualified workforce within a company
(Lutz 1987, p. 4).
The growing demand for skilled workers, both in the ma-
chine construction industry and by the German production
model itself, including an increasing degree of specializa-
tion and high quality production, thus had a strong im-
pact on the emergence of the core workforce. Against this
backdrop, during the Weimar Republic, market segmenta-
tion was determined by stabilized working relationships.
Those workers who were already employed within firms
were protected by trade unions, sectoral bargaining, dis-
missal protection, diversified and large-scale production as
well as occupational skills gained by vocational education
and training.
Nonetheless, these protections limited the access to the
labor market of those workers who were not yet employed.
Compared to the industrialization era, institutional arrange-
ments became more crucial in determining labor market
segmentation. And yet, the valuation of skills by employers
increased due to a shift towards a high quality production
and the spread of the apprenticeships, owing to increas-
ing international competition, display strong features of the
economic-functional dimension regarding the segmentation
process. Consequently, during this period, both dimensions
promoted the segmentation process in Germany.
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Fig. 3 Unemployment devel-
opment (in millions) in Germany
1925–1939, Source Tooze, 2007,
p. 72
5 The end of the Weimar Republic and the rise of
the Third Reich
The global economic crisis, starting in 1929, led to a
tremendous increase of the unemployed, as Fig. 3 displays.
Following the National Socialist takeover on January 30,
1933, the situation of the labor market and the general
employment system changed fundamentally. By freezing
both prices and wages, the economy changed towards a
planned economy. Yet, owing to a positive development
of the world economy, rationalization successes during the
1920s and early 1930s as well as a massive armament by
the new regime, unemployment decreased significantly. As
part of the act of establishing the ‘Order of National Labor’
(Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit), the collective
agreement procedures from 1918 and the works council
act of 1920 were dissolved. The core of the employer-
employee relationship was no longer determined by the
collective agreement. Instead, the concept of a collective
company (Betriebsgemeinschaft) was formed, which estab-
lished the entrepreneur as leader of the company and the
workers as their followers (Kendzia 2010b, p. 24–25).
The enlargement of apprenticeship programs went in line
with the introduction of a uniform and, after 1938, compul-
sory training system (Kutscha 1993, p. 19). Moreover, the
school law included the obligation for industrial education
for all school-leavers.
Concerning the vocational training system, the National
Socialists further standardized the system to enable bet-
ter military production. Nevertheless, as a result of the
huge demand for semi-skilled jobs within the armaments
industry, the reserves of German male workers were soon
exhausted. To overcome this workforce scarcity, foreign-
ers became essential for the German production process
(Gillingham 1985, p. 423–428).
In the early period of the war, workers between 18 and
45 were conscripted first. Workers in companies involved in
the war industry and other indispensable workers above the
age of 30 could continue their activities within the work-
force. Later, after October 1944, the age group subjected
to conscription was extended to all men in the range of 16
to 60 (Puhani 2014, p. 3). After 1939, workers from oc-
cupied countries were recruited or forced to work within
the German industry. Initially, recruitment occurred on a
voluntary basis, except for Polish workers who were forced
from the very beginning. As the war progressed, the vol-
untary contracts were converted into forced labor. Work-
ers from Poland and Eastern Europe (Russia, Belorussia
and Ukraine) constituted the majority of forced laborers,
amounting to more than 66 %. Among the forced laborers,
different segments that faced different working conditions
are distinguishable, with Polish and East European workers,
being exposed to the worst conditions. In general, forced
laborers were confronted with low wages and long working
hours (Bräutigam 2009).
The chemical industry was of major importance for the
armaments industry and IG Farbenindustrie cooperated
closely with the Nazi regime. When the demand for work-
ers increased, the company started to hire forced laborers.
In 1944, out of the entire workforce of the chemical plants
in Hüls (Chemische Werke Hüls), 27 % were forced la-
borers (Kleinschulte 2003). Since there was still a need
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for more workers, IG Farbenindustrie also constructed
concentration camps close to Auschwitz to recruit workers
(Schmaltz 2010). In the same vein, the metal and electrical
industry recruited forced laborers. As an example, Siemens
AG one third of all workers in Berlin were forced workers,
mostly stemming from concentration camps. Within the
metal industry, the amount of foreign and forced workers
is estimated at 30 % throughout Germany. Examples from
the machinery industry, employing forced workers include
Daimler Benz AG and Deutsche Maschinen AG (DEMAG)
(Fransecky 2003, p. 99).
From an economic-functional point of view, forced
workers and women were often used outside their skill
area. This caused many concerns among German employ-
ers, since higher investments were needed when engaging
non-specified workers with lower productivity. Compa-
nies therefore aimed at regaining their core workforce.
However, as the war progressed, the core workforce was
no longer available, and more forced workers were used.
In some factories they amounted to about 80–90 %, with
only a small amount of German specialists and foremen
(Bräutigam 2009).
To increase the workforce, women from the consumer
goods industry, who had lost their jobs, now took over
places in war industry. As a consequence, since they
were not previously trained in that area, the productivity
within the German industry declined (Stephenson 2013,
p. 95–111). Because forced workers and women were
less productive due to low working conditions and their
placement in tasks outside of their trained skill area, they
became part of the peripheral workforce.
The peripheral workforce developed during the Nazi
regime for political reasons according to ideological and
racist criteria, causing frequent productivity decreases. As
the changes and the development of the core workforce
were to a large extent determined by political regulations,
the segmentation process during this period took place in
a historically highly exceptional environment. Through the
widely and compulsory application of the vocational and
educational training system and the intense use of women,
guest and later forced workers, economic-functional con-
siderations aimed at safeguarding the production process.
Nevertheless, in this manner, the boundary lines between
the peripheral and core workforce became blurry, as the
latter group disappeared gradually due to the large-scale
military conscription.
6 From the end of World War II to the first oil
crisis
After World War II, the social market economy became the
economic policy of the new political system in West Ger-
many. The emergence of the welfare state developed in
line with a cooperative and long-term production regime.
This institutional fit between the production model and so-
cial policy determined the labor market segmentation in
that era. To explain this development, the institutional as-
pects will be highlighted first, and secondly, by referring to
the economic-functional theory, the production model will
be described. Concerning institutional factors, especially
important was the increasing power of work councils and
collective bargaining. After World War II, codetermination
was restored and expanded. The reason for the strong po-
sition of the workers and their representation during this
time was that the occupying powers mistrusted the German
employers because of their close and intense cooperation
with the Nazi regime. In line with the economic recovery
after World War II, Lutz (1987) argues that internal labor
markets were closed down and instead a firm-centered labor
market segmentation spread (Lutz 1987, p. 165).
According to this perspective, the dividing line between
a peripheral and core workforce developed in particular af-
ter World War II. This assessment is controversial, as other
authors point out that firm-centered labor market segmen-
tation set in at a much earlier stage. Schmiede (1986) and
Schudlich (1994) both emphasize that a personnel policy
at company level, aiming at keeping a certain workforce
within the firm, existed already since the beginning of the
industrialization process. They argue that already during
the time of early factories, the owners attempted to keep
their master craftsmen. Similarly, as Pierenkemper (1981)
states, the segmentation of the (internal) labor market of
large companies constituted a permanent problem, aris-
ing already decades before the World War I (Pierenkemper
1981, p. 5). Likewise, Littler (1982) points to the existence
of this personnel policy during the very beginning of cap-
italist societies. Thereafter, the assessment made by Lutz
is highly questionable. However, after the loss of territory,
many displaced people fled to West Germany. Addition-
ally, due to the emergence of a communist government in
East Germany, known as the German Democratic Repub-
lic (DDR), many parts of West Germany attracted series
of refugees. Those people were grown up in urban areas
and often were more educated than people from rural areas.
Owing to their experiences within the industrial production
and organization processes, they formed a pool of a highly
useful workforce by taking on nearly every workplace they
could get (Lutz 1987, p. 204–205).
However, in the course of the building of the Berlin Wall
and the inner-German border, this workforce source ran dry.
Whereas in the 1950s recruitment agreements concerning
guest workers from Italy and Spain were concluded, later, in
the 1960s, guest workers came even from Greece, Turkey,
and Yugoslavia to West Germany (Lutz 1987, p. 259).
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Apart from the economic-functional logic in terms of
attracting a large enough workforce for the again flourish-
ing German industry, the political institutional dimension
shaped substantially the working conditions of the core
workforce. Thereafter, the 1951 ‘Codetermination Law in
the Coal and Steel Industry’ (Montanmitbestimmungsge-
setz) foresaw full-parity codetermination in the board of
directors in companies employing more than 1000 workers.
Only one year later, in 1952, according to the Works Consti-
tution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), each company with
more than five employees had to install plant-level codeter-
mination through works councils. Since the 1950s, national
and centralized collective bargaining rounds took place be-
tween trade unions and employers associations, such as
Gesamtmetall in the metal industry. Those rounds negoti-
ated the general working conditions as well as wage rates
for the workforce. Due to this fact, the internal life of a firm
was often heavily influenced by labor legislation and col-
lective agreements from outside (Streeck 2001, p. 11–16).
In the aftermath, the status of the core workforce was in-
creasingly protected against the volatilities of the market.
Additionally, long-term unemployment benefits enabled
workers to refuse workplaces below their formal qualifica-
tions. Thereby, deskilling could be prevented and in par-
ticular the high-skilled workforce was preserved. In the
same vein, a comparatively high job security protected the
core workforce (Manow 2001, p. 99). During this time, the
so-called standard employment relationship, characterized
by long-term employment, comprehensive social protec-
tion in the form of a dependent full-time job, was more and
more modeled. The general conditions of which were laid
down by collective agreement, labor and social security law
(Bosch 2004, p. 618–619). Whereas during the 19th cen-
tury only scarce and important skilled workers were bound
to the company, the further political-institutional upgrading
of this employment relationship reflected an expansion of
this protection for even semi-skilled workers in particular
within the chemical industry (Schmiede 1997, p. 45).
As regards functional factors, the self-governed voca-
tional education and training system, including a strong
participation of the state, as well as the dualistic indus-
trial structure became increasingly important. Between all
relevant interest groups widespread consensus existed that
nearly all young people should get the opportunity to com-
plete an apprenticeship. What Schelsky (1952) titled the
‘vocational need of the youth’, resulted in an expansion of
apprenticeship positions. From a long-term perspective, this
led to a sustainable and logic step based between schooling
and employment (Blossfeld 1986).
Owing to the implementation of Fordist methods in the
German automobile industry, the skilled workforce was
pulled out from the production line and shifted to sur-
rounding activities such as maintenance, electrical work,
tool making or other activities, safeguarding the quality of
the production. As a consequence, a large amount of semi-
and unskilled workers entered the factory halls. For exam-
ple, within the entire German automobile industry in 1940,
the skilled workforce accounted for 38.7 %, whereas the
share was only 29 % in the beginning of the 1970s (Her-
rigel 1996, p. 208–228).
This kind of structural pattern could also be observed
within the American automobile industry. By investigat-
ing the automobile industry across the United States, Köh-
ler (1981) found that the principle of seniority played a
dominant role between different workplaces. That is, the
main focus was put on the production process, containing
a high degree of substitutability of lower qualified and less
experienced workers. An enhancement of the individual’s
qualification was thus not considered as being of utmost im-
portance within the production process (Lutz 1987, p. 57).
However, compared to plants in other countries, the pro-
portion of the skilled workforce within the German auto-
mobile industry remained high. This can partially be asso-
ciated with the further expansion of the vocational training
system initiated by the Allies. Thereby, the responsibility of
the vocational education and training system was delegated
to the self-government of both the handicraft sector and in-
dustry. Beside the on-the-job training through the firms, a
large amount of the costs, arising from building and main-
taining vocational schools, were covered by the state. As
a result, the attractiveness to employ apprentices enhanced.
In this way, a dualistic industrial structure emerged with a
technology driven core of large firms surrounded by smaller
technologically unsophisticated firms – the so-called ‘ex-
panded workbench’ (verlängerte Werkbank).
In the following, firms like Grundig, AEG, Siemens,
MAN and Audi moved into mass production and could rely
heavily on suppliers. In particular large firms were in the
position to provide relatively stable working relationships.
In contrast, when a recession hit, the suppliers were the
first to suffer and the last to recover. Thus, the employment
relationships inside these supplier firms were as irregular as
the production process. Regions with such supplier firms
had high proportions of women, migrant or guest workers.
For instance, in 1961, the total share of women of all man-
ufacturing workers amounted to 45.4 % in the Chamber of
Commerce district of South Westphalia; most of them were
employed in the iron and metal working industries (Herrigel
1996, p. 208–228). According to this, suppliers tended to
recruit rather a peripheral workforce instead of a core work-
force. The risk – and thus the costs – of hiring and firing
were shifted to the peripheral workforce. During 1945 and
1973, as the core workforce was mainly employed by large
technology driven firms, unskilled workers often had no
other option than working for supplier firms. Against this
backdrop, suppliers formed a ‘port of entry’ into the labor
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market for mostly unskilled workers, encompassing to a
large extent women, migrants, and guest workers.
Whereas in the 1950s a policy of hiring and firing
characterized the employment strategy of companies,
the labor scarcity in the course of the economic mira-
cle (Wirtschaftswunderjahre) in Germany induced other
adjustment measures such as the employment of agency
workers and short-time work. These instruments helped
stabilize the core workforce without generating any major
additional costs for the companies (Dombois 1986, p. 59).
Another instrument in order to keep the core workforce
constitutes continuous training in companies. First men-
tioned in 1878 and already in place prior to World War II,
the importance of continuous training in terms of a qual-
ification of the workforce became increasingly important.
After a first upswing during the 1950s, this phenomenon
spread continuously in the machine construction industry
and later within the electrical and chemical industry (Sass
et al. 1974, p. 62–63).
In 1951 the dismissal protection law limited the employ-
ers’ right to dissolve the employment relationship to social
adversities. One criterion for the core workforce, namely
the duration of employment, which was already part of the
dismissal protection in 1927, was addressed later during a
further modification of the law. Another measure to in-
centivize stable and long-term employment concerning the
core workforce, evolved through voluntary corporate social
benefits, comprising occupational pensions and company-
owned apartments. However, the immediate eviction from
the apartment was often used as a sanctioning mechanism.
To reduce the impact of those ‘golden chains’, changes in
tenancy law in the area of company-owned apartments al-
lowed workers to stay in their apartments even after leaving
the firm (Lutz 1987, p. 224).
In 1956, an investigation within the German steel in-
dustry found that beside the companies the public as well
showed a strong interest in housing for workers of large
companies. Through this, the dividing line between eco-
nomic-functional and political-institutional measures to sta-
bilize the core workforce becomes blurry (Schäfer 1956,
p. 84–91). In the 1960s a disproportionate large job growth
occurred within the tertiary sector, including branches such
as trade, finance, insurances, and other service-oriented
branches. As Table 3 shows, another institutional factor
arose, shaping the workforce segmentation in the 1960s
through hiring agency workers for a restricted time period
in order to cope with production peaks. This recruitment
source, initially offered by Swiss temporary work agencies,
was legalized by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1967
and complemented the existing core workforce. The de-
mand for those workers was particularly strong within the
construction sector and the metal industry but did not affect
to a large extent the composition of the workforce inside
the chemical, electrical or machine construction industry
(Emmenegger and Marx 2010, p. 12).
In 1966/67 an economic downturn led to losses of firm-
specific skills, beside high costs due to unemployment.
Only workers with a long duration of employment for a
specific company benefited from a particular dismissal pro-
tection (Lutz 1987, p. 230–234). An investigation in 1969
concluded that industrial companies tended to adjust the ex-
isting workforce to changing production and working con-
ditions in their own interest by avoiding dismissals as re-
gards the core workforce. The execution of layoffs was
considered as a measure within an extreme situation and
could harm the companies‘ image. Additionally, the study
points out that women, foreigners, and unskilled workers
were affected most in contrast to male, German, and skilled
workers or employees (Böhle and Lutz 1974, p. 24).
The reason for the strong and sensitive consideration
of the core workforce was closely related to the general
scarcity of workers and employees during the 1960s and
early 1970s. Differential dismissal protection, comprising
longer notice periods and severance payment, which de-
pended on the duration of employment, further increased
the costs to lay-off workers stemming from the core work-
force. According to the Federal Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs, at the end of the 1970s approximately 48 %
of all workers were comprehensively protected. The Work
Constitution Act in 1972 strengthened the role of the works
councils in terms of dismissals so that measures against
the essential interests of the core workforce became nearly
impossible.
This, in turn, resulted in hiring certain workers for the
core workforce who met the requirements, including per-
sonal traits such as age, a good physical constitution and
the ability to learn. Moreover, both the living circumstances
and the visible behavior in view of a permanently remaining
within the company were expected in order to gain firm-
specific skills. At the same time, this hiring behavior ex-
cluded those with a lacking ability to learn and formability,
comprising young and married women, who were likely
to leave the labor market in the long run, foreigners, who
were assumed to return to their home country one day, as
well as so-called ‘migratory birds’, defining workers with
only short employment periods. As a consequence, workers
and employees learned that stable and attractive workplaces
were rather found among the core workforce. As a conse-
quence, the behavior of people on the external labor market
became increasingly risk-averse (Lutz 1987, p. 240–250).
7 After the first oil crisis until the present time
The results of an empirical analysis based on anonymized
staff data of a large machinery company in Western-Ger-
K
Workforce segmentation in Germany: from the founding era to the present time 309
Table 3 Main periods in the historical development of job security regulations in Germany
Main institutional developments and legal changes
Until 1914 Liberal regime: virtually no restrictions on the freedom to dismiss
1920 Emergence of job security regulation in Works Councils Act: Employees can appeal to works council against notice, if it
is based on invalid reasons (e. g. not related to personal conduct or situation of the enterprise, based on religion, political
affiliation, etc.). If the employer rejects re-employment, worker is entitled to compensation. Severance pay depended
years of tenure, maximum half an annual wage
1951 Restoration/expansion in Dismissal Protection Act: dismissal in exceptional cases only, individual right to appeal appli-
cable for companies with six or more employees, social protection criteria, right to re-employment, severance pay up to
one annual wage
1951–1970s Stability in the context of strong economic growth, full employment and labor shortage. Incremental emergence of
agency work (regulated in Manpower). Act of 1973. The 1972 Works Constitution Act does not lead to significant
changes
1980s Marginal reform in Employment Promotion Act (1985): fixed-term contracts without valid reasons up to 18 months,
agency work assignments up to six months
Source Emmenegger and Marx (2010, p. 19)
Table 4 Job entry, duration of employment, and exit rate at Südwerk
German men Foreign men German
women
Foreign
women
Total
Assignment of new entrants to the following
job categories
(N = 1962) (N = 1090) (N = 162) (N = 74) (N = 3288)
Work assistant
Machine operator
Quality control
Apprentices
4.3
53.7
8.7
33.3
20.0
73.7
2.4
3.9
3.1
61.1
18.5
17.3
2.7
86.5
8.1
2.7
9.4
61.4
7.1
22.1
Arithmetic average of the duration of employ-
ment in cross section (in years)
(N = 2921) (N = 1297) (N = 333) (N = 121) (N = 4672)
1976
1984
12.4
13.3
5.8
9.4
10.5
12.3
6.3
9.5
10.3
12.0
Exit rates during ...
... the years of expansion 1979, 1980 and 1981
... the years of contraction 1982, 1983 and
1984
7.3
7.0
6.3
15.3
7.8
10.9
4.9
17.8
7.0
10.1
Source Köhler and Preisendörfer (1981, p. 271–273)
Table 5 Composition of the core workforce in cross section at Südwerk
1976
(N = 1235)
1984
(N = 1260)
German men 94.9 82.4
Foreign men 0.9 8.8
German women 4.2 8.2
Foreign women 0.0 0.6
Source Köhler and Preisendörfer (1981, p. 276)
many reveal the internal segmentation in various dimen-
sions between 1976 and 1984, as Table 4 shows. During
this time, roughly 5000 workers were employed at the op-
eration called Südwerk – the exact name of the operation
was not mentioned within the study.
The investigation indicates that the apprenticeship served
as point of entry into the core workforce. Most apprentices
were German men, whereas foreigners were barred from
access. As Table 5 displays, a certain cluster of work-
ers could be identified as core workforce, comprising of a
higher workplace category, a higher average wage group,
a below-average workload as well as a long duration of
employment. This group amounted to 30 % of the entire
workforce during the assessment period. While male Ger-
mans occupied most of the core workplaces, foreign men
and women were assigned to peripheral workplaces. The
latter group carried the main burden of workforce adjust-
ments during contraction phases. However, in the course of
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time the dividing lines of segmentation shifted and atten-
uated (Köhler and Preisendörfer 1981, p. 269–276). As a
result, as Sengenberger found for the late 1970s (Sengen-
berger 1978), the growing amount of unemployed people
reflected the existence of strong – and well protected – in-
ternal labor markets and consisted of many young people
who left the educational system and faced tough competi-
tion with members of the core workforce.
The working relationship of a typical worker from the
core workforce during this time can be described as follows:
Following a regulated vocational education the worker or
employee entered ‘a steady, permanent full time occupa-
tion, in which one found an occupation with sufficient earn-
ings, promotion prospects and with a holiday-leave policy
and regulated working hours, which one kept their whole
life long, until the pensionable age where one can enjoy
an adequate retirement for as long as possible after that’
(Pierenkemper 2009, p. 11).
However, during the 1980s and 1990s, a more sophis-
ticated and flexible production process increased the de-
mand for higher skilled workers and innovative organiza-
tion forms, all of which changed the labor market and the
institutions that dominated it for a long time. Whereas the
political-institutional analysis focuses on alternative em-
ployment relationships, the economic-functional analysis
concentrates on skill formation. Both aspects contributed
to further segmenting the labor market after the first oil cri-
sis. Since labor policy underwent an inconsistent sequence
of deregulatory and re-regulatory phases after the first oil
crisis, reforms were characterized by short-term orienta-
tion and transformation through incremental change. Ad-
ditionally, the apprenticeship system was also subjected to
reforms resulting from decreasing apprentice ratios which
occurred during the structural change from the manufactur-
ing sector to the service sector. All these reforms aimed
at enhancing the flexibility of the system and facilitating
modernization (Thelen 2007, p. 254).
Today, occupational qualifications, which can be at-
tributed to the phenomenon of inter-company labor mar-
kets, can be found in the construction sector, the software
industry as well as in the health care sector. Within these
traditional sectors, standardized workplaces and qualifica-
tion profiles have proved to facilitate and foster the mobility
between companies (Köhler et al. 2007, p. 393).
The modernization of the labor market occurred via a
flexibilization at the margin. As the privileges of the stan-
dard employment relationship needed to be preserved, the
only viable option was establishing a secondary segment
of atypical jobs, causing a dualization in terms of wages
and employment security. These atypical jobs have had
two effects: on the one hand, they stabilized the core work-
force by relieving reform pressure on the overall system;
on the other hand, as a cheap alternative, they constituted
an immediate danger to regular employment. A more dy-
namic labor market contradicted core workers’ as well as
employers’ interests, as incentives to invest in skills are
still a prerequisite for the German production model. At
the present time a stable core workforce combined with a
limited use of temporary agency work serves as a typical
pattern in manufacturing and chemical companies, as it al-
lows them to retain firm-specific knowledge in economic
downturns (Eichhorst and Marx 2011). However, atypical
employment should not be equated with precarious work-
places, as precariousness is associated with an insufficient
social security (Keller and Seifert 2000, 2006).
Even so, the standard employment relationship is still the
most prevalent contract within the chemical, metal and elec-
trical industries, as the workers needed in these industries
have high levels of craft skills and require stable employ-
ment to invest in their skills. Nonetheless, working time
and pay have become much more flexible due to changes
in collective agreements and shop-floor practices. Char-
acteristics of these open-ended contracts consist of a long
tenure and high collective bargaining coverage. Atypical
employment is especially observable within the service sec-
tor, since it differs from the diversified production model
(Streeck 1991, 1997) used within the industrial production
process and relies on more general skills and part of the
service sector acts as a supplier for the described industries
(Hassel 2014).
Consequently, from an institutional point of view the
labor market is today segmented along the dividing line
between standard and non-standard working relationships
that are associated with different types of tasks and groups
of workers. The rise of service sector jobs has contributed
to a more segmented overall picture of the German labor
market, as Fig. 4 demonstrates.
These institutional changes went along with an eco-
nomic-functional change towards a more flexible produc-
tion process. Globalization and increasing international
competition made firms more vulnerable of economic fluc-
tuations. In the course of globalization the division of labor
within the world economy has been intensified (Lammers
1999). In general, the division of labor between firms can
hardly be discussed without taking into account the divi-
sion of labor among different states. Here, it is entirely
sufficient to point out that the ongoing division of labor
between firms is marked by a specialization process. This,
in turn, leads to a stronger retention of workers with firm-
specific knowledge. In the automobile construction indus-
try, Bertram (1992) for instance, found that manufacturers
and their suppliers in terms of highly specialized compo-
nents have been developing close and intense relationships,
comprising even a certain spatial proximity. Whereas be-
tween automobile manufacturers and suppliers of standard-
K
Workforce segmentation in Germany: from the founding era to the present time 311
Fig. 4 The workforce in Germany according to the employment status, 1992–2012, Source Socio-economic panel (SOEP) 1992–2012, own
calculations by IZA
ized components global sourcing opportunities were ob-
served.
To remain competitive, superior quality, higher flexibil-
ity, and lower costs were deemed necessary. Moreover,
due to technological changes, broader skills were demanded
(Thelen 2007, p. 250). These general skills encompass both
a high level of often tertiary education, in connection with
project work or freelancers, and a low level from employ-
ees qualified for other occupations or (re-)entering the labor
market, in connection with marginal employment or agency
work. Independent of these skill requirements, the prevalent
contracts are atypical and therefore consist of limited em-
ployment protection, a low tenure and high wage dispersion
(Eichhorst and Marx 2009). Following the argumentation
of Eichhorst and Marx (2009), in accordance with Keller
and Seifert (2007), atypical employment is equated with the
peripheral workforce in this article.
During the financial crisis, employment stability in
the observed industries was accomplished through short-
time work and working time accounts, whereas temporary
agency workers and fixed-term contract holders were made
redundant. In doing so, peripheral workplaces face today
major employment risks and acts as a buffer easing the ad-
justment pressure on the core. Yet, peripheral workplaces
contribute to better labor market access and additional
job creation, which, in turn, generates additional income
from work (Eichhorst and Tobsch 2014). Today, within
the manufacturing sector, many temporary contracts are
transformed into long-term contracts. Since firm-specific
skills can only be achieved after longer periods of em-
ployment, those workplaces often reveal an above-average
tenure (Eichhorst et al. 2013).
In this context, Castel (2000a, 2000b) for example raises
the question, where discontinuous career paths and the po-
tential threat of social exclusion through precarious work-
places or implications for those, being out of the workforce
for longer periods are leading. Despite the fact that the
author particularly addresses France, other authors (Kalle-
berg 2009; Scherer 2004; Kalleberg et al. 2000) as well
deal with similar questions regarding the future of social
cohesion through atypical employment or rather non-stan-
dard employment relationships. The adjustments made in
terms of part-time work, the expansion of temporary work
and other changes indicate an increased flexibility in the ex-
ternal labor market. Numerous employment relationships
in the internal labor market, which still are legally and
formally standard employment relationships, for instance
by individual working-times, flexible payments, sabbaticals
and others, do not longer comply with the idea of a tra-
ditional standard employment relationship (Pierenkemper
2009, p. 14). Against this background, a certain decrease
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of structural rigidities regarding the working relationship
for the core workforce is observable today.
8 Conclusions
As correctly noted by Reich et al. (1973), the segmentation
process in Germany constituted a historical process where
political-institutional and economic-functional factors were
responsible for the division of the labor market. In the be-
ginning of our analysis, from the founding era until World
War I, the bargaining power of workers was heavily re-
stricted. At the same time, the fluctuation rates were high,
amounting to average employment durations of one year.
According to estimates made by Ditt (1994), in the begin-
ning of the industrialization only roughly one fourth of all
workers belonged to the core workforce.
Over the course of time this picture changed as work-
ers were bound closer to the employing companies, pri-
marily within the German metal, electrical and chemical
industries. In the same vein, and in accordance to the sur-
vey made by Loveridge (1983) and Hakim (1990), it was
shown that through these processes the labor market could
be characterized by a dichotomization between a core and
a peripheral workforce. This became particularly evident
when looking at the observed industries. In later periods,
we found that suppliers often employed a peripheral work-
force, including low or semi-skilled workers. However, in
1910 at Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft for instance, more
than 70 % of the overall workforce belonged to the core
workforce.
As Piore (1983), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001) and
Layard et al. (2005) show, large parts of the labor mar-
ket are regulated by institutions. In particular after the
major ruptures following World War I and World War II,
the asymmetry of bargaining power shifted from the em-
ployers’ to the employees’ side. The development of the
German welfare state after World War II embedded many
elements which were already created during the Weimar
Republic. Thus, the formation of the standard employment
relationship was influenced by certain exceptional histor-
ical and political constellations. This became particularly
evident when the role of work councils and the power of the
unions were strengthened. According to data from the fed-
eral statistical office, in the 1970s approximately 48 % of
the entire workforce can be assigned to the core workforce.
Regarding the economic-functional explanatory ap-
proach (Friedman 1977; Layard and Nickel 1999; Emme-
negger 2009; Hall and Soskice 2001), the segmentation
process is influenced by a change in the production strat-
egy of firms for economic efficiency reasons. This theory
along with the concept of skill formation explains that
core activities require high and firm-specific skills that
can be achieved, for instance, by a vocational training
system. This system proved to be successful within the
observed industries as both parties, employers and work-
ers, were responsible for the creation and maintenance
of this system. Moreover, we found evidence within the
metal, chemical and machine construction industries for the
protection of skill investments by retaining a core work-
force. This assumption made by Lutz (1973), Williamson
(1985), Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) as well as Estevez-
Abe et al. (2001) stress the importance of firm specific
knowledge and highly specified workers. Those activities,
including core activities for the production process of a
firm, are today embedded into long-term contracts.
This is particular true for the manufacturing industry,
where the service sector is more strongly segmented for
various reasons. Thereby, the dividing line between the
core and peripheral workforce becomes increasingly blurry,
since often skilled workers or employees only belong to
the peripheral workforce, owing to their absence of a stan-
dard employment relationship. This is the case, although
the peripheral and core workforce frequently execute the
same extensive range of tasks. In addition to identifying a
mixed system, namely the apprenticeship system, including
elements following an economic-functional and political-
institutional logic, we found that during industrialization,
a more functional approach segmented the labor market.
Later, a shift towards a stronger institutional structuring of
the workforce occurred.
The latest development of the segmentation process is
again marked by a more combined logic. This can be ex-
plained by the maintenance and adaptation to diversified
quality production in a more ‘purified’ industrial core still
dominated by standard employment relationships. Yet, this
core is supported by a secondary segment of increasingly
important atypical contracts and service occupations. As a
general conclusion the authors argue that the labor market
in Germany has always been segmented, but the dividing
line between the primary segment of the employment sys-
tem – the core – and the secondary segment – the margin
– has been redefined over time.
Functional considerations added by political decisions
regarding labor law and social protection led to the estab-
lishment of an increasingly institutionalized standard em-
ployment relationship that is still dominant in the industrial
sector. The size and the composition of the marginal work-
force changed based on business restructuring, available
labor supply and institutional options for employment de-
viating from the standard. And yet, in 2012 41 % of all
employees and workers possessed a standard employment
relationship. Given that not all of them have been work-
ing for the same employer for two years, as the criteria of
the core workforce is defined, this indicates that almost ap-
proximately 41 % of the entire workforce today can still be
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attributed to the core workforce. Hence, it would certainly
be wrong to assume that the dualization of the German labor
market is a peculiar phenomenon of the last 20 to 30 years,
but it is becoming more visible in the more prominent role
of non-standard employment relationships in particular in
the increasingly important service sector.
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